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STANDING IN THE DESERT:  
PRUDENTIAL STANDING IN WILDERNESS 
SOCIETY v. KANE COUNTY 
Lisa S. Greenberg* 
Abstract: Kane County, Utah stripped federal land in southern Utah of 
signs prohibiting off-road vehicles. Despite pleas from The Wilderness 
Society (TWS), a conservation organization, the county passed an ordi-
nance legalizing its actions. TWS filed suit, claiming the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibited the county from interfering 
with federally authorized signs. On January 11, 2011, an en banc opinion 
of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied prudential standing to 
TWS. The court characterized the case as a property dispute, finding that 
TWS was impermissibly asserting the rights of the federal government. 
This Comment explores how the court’s analysis neglected the individual 
harms asserted by TWS’s members and applied the rules of prudential 
standing without deference to the separation of powers concept from 
which they arose. 
Introduction 
 Federal land in southern Utah encompasses a vast network of 
famous canyons, stunning vistas, and architectural rock formations.1 
In 1996, President Clinton designated a staggering 1.7 million acres of 
rugged terrain as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument 
(Monument).2 
 The Monument is split into three main regions.3 The first is a 
staircase of more than 6000 vertical feet of multi-colored sedimentary 
rock layers stretching approximately 150 miles between Bryce Canyon 
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 Southern Utah Parks & Monuments, S. Utah’s Kane County, http://www.kaneutah. 
com/southern-utah-national-parks.cfm(last visited Apr. 3, 2012).Other famous areas in 
Kane County include Bryce Canyon, Zion National Park, Lake Powell, and the north rim 
of the Grand Canyon. Id. 
2 Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 18, 1996). 
3 Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Utah.com, http://www.utah.com/national 
sites/grand_staircase.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
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and the northern rim of the Grand Canyon.4 Second, the Kaiparowits 
Plateau is a fossil-rich, arid landscape covering more than 800,000 acres 
across southern Utah.5 The third region features the vast maze of the 
Canyons of the Escalante, spanning almost 7000 feet in elevation and 
including water-carved sandstone features, such as plummeting canyon 
walls, rock pedestals, arches, and natural bridges.6 
 Though the federal government controls the Monument area 
through the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), it did not object 
when local authorities declared a right-of-way over closed roads in the 
Monument area.7 To protect the area from off-road vehicle traffic, 
members of The Wilderness Society (TWS), a leading conservation or-
ganization, brought suit against the local authority, Kane County, 
Utah.8 Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
ruled in Wilderness Society v. Kane County (Wilderness Society IV ) that TWS 
“does not assert a valid right to relief on its own.”9 The court held that 
TWS lacked prudential standing, a threshold requirement necessary 
for a federal court to hear a case.10 
 This Comment first discusses the facts and procedural history of 
Wilderness Society.11 Then it explains the evolution of the rules for pru-
dential standing and their relationship to the separation of powers em-
bodied in the U.S. Constitution.12 Finally, Section III argues both that 
TWS’s individual harm provides the group with standing and that 
proper application of the separation of powers concept underlying 
prudential standing would allow TWS to sue.13 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 In the mid-1800s, the federal government actively promoted eco-
nomic development and settlement in the West, including southern 
                                                                                                                      
4 Utah Geological Survey, What Is the Grand Staircase? 1, 2 (1999), available at 
http://geology.utah.gov/online/pdf/pi-64.pdf. 
5 Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, supra note 3. 
6 Grand Staircase-Escalante NM Information, Utah.com, http://www.utah.com/playgrounds/ 
canyons_of_escalante.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
7 See Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y IV ), 632 F.3d 1162, 1165, 1172 
(10th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
8 Id. at 1166–67; About Us, The Wilderness Society, http://wilderness.org/content/ 
about-us (last visited Apr. 3, 2012). 
9 632 F.3d at 1170. 
10 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1165. 
11 See infra notes 14–49 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 50–85 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 86–135 and accompanying text. 
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Utah, by allowing pioneers to construct and use roads on unreserved 
public lands.14 Revised Statute 2477 (R.S. 2477), enacted in 1866, em-
bodied Congress’s pro-development lands policy.15 R.S. 2477 stated 
that, “the right of way for the construction of highways over public 
lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.”16 Such rights-of-
way allowed people to travel freely through federally owned land and 
simultaneously promoted the development of rural private land.17 The 
right-of-way required no formal procedures or acceptance by the fed-
eral government and became effective with the creation of a “highway” 
over lands not reserved for public use.18 
 In 1976, with the need for expansion subdued and federal atten-
tion shifting towards conservation and environmental protection, Con-
gress repealed R.S. 2477 by passing the Federal Land Policy and Man-
agement Act (FLPMA).19 Though the FLPMA prevented the establish-
ment of new rights-of-way, existing rights-of-way remained intact.20 
 More recently, a BLM plan for the Monument excluded off-
highway motor vehicle use from previously used R.S. 2477 routes.21 
This change followed increased worries that the roads and nearby lands 
could be permanently degraded.22 To implement the closures, the 
BLM put up numerous signs prohibiting off-highway motor vehicle use 
along the closed roadways.23 The BLM plan, however, stated that the 
                                                                                                                      
14 Lindsay Houseal, Wilderness Society v. Kane County, Utah: A Welcome Change for the 
Tenth Circuit and Environmental Groups, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 725, 726 (2010). 
15 See An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public 
Lands, and for Other Purposes, Ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866) (codified at 43 
U.S.C. § 932), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94–579 § 706, 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1761–1771); see S. Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 2005). 
16 Ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. at 253. 
17 See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,425 F.3d at 740–41. 
18 Id. at 741; Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1078 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by Vil-
lage of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1992). The 
Tenth Circuit has limited the definition of “highways.” Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. 
(Wilderness Soc’y IV ), 632 F.3d 1162, 1181 (10th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Lucero, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing how “R.S. 2477 rights have been falsely claimed over dry creek beds, horse 
and hiking trails, and jagged rock outcroppings”). 
19 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 706, 90 Stat. at 2793; S. Utah 
Wilderness Alliance, 425 F.3d at 741. 
20 § 701, 90 Stat. at 2786; Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1166. 
21 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1166 (noting the plan prohibited off-highway motor 
vehicles such as snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles). 
22 Brief of Appellees at 7 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 
2009) (No. 08–4090), 2008 WL 6058884. 
23 Id. 
44 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39: E. Supp. 
current restrictions on the use of the land were “‘subject to valid exist-
ing rights.’”24 
                                                                                                                     
 In March 2003, Kane County, the county in which the Monument 
is located, asserted that it had such a valid existing right under R.S. 
2477 to access closed roads in the Monument area.25 The County de-
manded that the BLM remove its signs26 and proposed temporary solu-
tions to the dispute.27 The BLM refused to remove its signs.28 Later that 
year, after sending a hostile letter to the BLM, Kane County took down 
more than thirty federal signs restricting access to the contested right-
of-way.29 The County wrote a second threatening letter to the BLM de-
scribing its actions and left both the letter and the confiscated signs 
outside a BLM office.30 
 In early 2005, Kane County put up its own signs, opening the pre-
viously closed roads to all forms of off-highway motor vehicle use.31 In 
response to the increased pressure from the County, the BLM sent the 
County a letter ordering it to stop erecting its own signs on the dis-
puted lands.32 Instead, the County enacted an ordinance in August 
2005 that opened county roads to off-highway vehicle use.33 The ordi-
nance did not specifically discuss federal lands, but clearly authorized 
the County’s actions.34 As Justice Lucero would later note in his dissent, 
“the county declared an all-terrain vehicle ‘vroom-vroom’ free-for-all.”35 
 On October 13, 2005, The Wilderness Society and other environ-
mental organizations filed a complaint against Kane County in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah.36 TWS claimed 
that the County’s removal and replacement of the federal signs, as well 
as the enactment of the county ordinance authorizing the posting of 
the signs, conflicted with existing federal law designating the routes as 
closed to off-highway motor vehicle use.37 TWS argued that the federal 
 
24 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1166. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. at 1182 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 1166 (majority opinion). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1182 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
30 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1182 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 1166 (majority opinion). 
32 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y III ), 581 F.3d 1198, 1206 (10th Cir. 
2009), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). 
33 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1166. 
34 Id.; see Brief of Appellees, supra note 22, at 11. 
35 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1182 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
36 Id. at 1165, 1167 (majority opinion). 
37 Id. at 1166–67. 
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plans preempted the County’s plans under the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.38 
 In 2006 the County moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that 
TWS lacked standing.39 The court denied the County’s motion, holding 
that TWS had proven constitutional standing and did not need to prove 
prudential standing because they had invoked the Supremacy clause.40 
Following the denial of the County’s motion to dismiss, the County re-
scinded the ordinance purporting to authorize its actions.41 The deci-
sion to rescind the ordinance rested on the County’s conclusion that 
such a concession would sway the court in its favor.42 The County, how-
ever, refused to remove all the signs authorizing off-highway motor vehi-
cle use on the federal land, and the conflict persisted.43 
 In May, 2008 the court granted TWS’s motion for summary judg-
ment, holding that both the county ordinance and the county signs 
conflicted with federal law and violated the Supremacy Clause.44 A 
panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the 
decision.45 The panel held that TWS had standing, and that the County 
could not exercise its rights-of-way in a manner conflicting with the 
federal regime without first proving that it had valid R.S. 2477 claims.46 
 The County petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the court 
granted its request.47 On January 11, 2011, the Court of Appeals, sitting 
en banc, held that TWS lacked prudential standing to sue.48 Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment order and 
remanded the case for dismissal.49 
II. Legal Background 
 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s inquiry into TWS’s 
prudential standing is grounded in the court’s recognition of the need 
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. at 1165; see U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
39 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y I ), 470 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1307 (D. 
Utah 2006). 
40 Id. at 1308. 
41 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1167. 
42 Id. at 1182 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
43 See id. 
44 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y II ), 560 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1166 (D. 
Utah 2008), aff’d, 581 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
45 Wilderness Soc’y III, 581 F.3d at 1205, 1226. 
46 Id. at 1213, 1221. 
47 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1164. 
48 Id. at 1164, 1165. 
49 Id. at 1174. 
46 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39: E. Supp. 
for limited judicial power.50 Fundamentally, this is a separation of pow-
ers concept.51 The idea of separation of powers was central in the 
founding of the United States, and is evidenced by the system of checks 
and balances in the U.S. Constitution.52 This system prevented the con-
centration of power, which the founders viewed as a root of tyranny.53 
Prudential standing embodies the separation of powers concept that 
was so important during the founding.54 Thus, like the checks and bal-
ances between the branches of government, the self-imposed standing 
requirements are founded in recognition of a need for a limited judi-
cial role in government.55 
 The standing requirements check the court’s power by limiting the 
number of plaintiffs who may have their disputes decided by the 
court.56 Plaintiffs must satisfy both Article III constitutional standing 
requirements57 and prudential limitations created by courts to curb 
their own power.58 Since prudential standing derives from the judici-
ary’s own sense of prudent self-governance—and not the Constitu-
tion—it may be overridden by statute.59 Such constraints on the federal 
court’s jurisdiction focus and limit the reach of the federal judicial 
power.60 Thus, within the judicial branch, the standing requirement is 
“an idea . . . about the constitutional and prudential limits to the pow-
ers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of govern-
ment.”61 
                                                                                                                      
50 Wilderness Socy’ v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y IV ), 632 F.3d 1162, 1168–72 (10th 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (examining the historical origins of prudential standing and applying 
the rationale to the decision); see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
51 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
52 See The Federalist Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison). 
53 See id. 
54 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
55 See id. at 498. 
56 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Warth, 422 U.S. at 
500. 
57 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Constitutional standing, 
not at issue in Wilderness Society IV, derives directly from the Article III requirement that a 
plaintiff must clearly state a “case-or-controversy.” Id. Plaintiffs must prove that they have 
suffered a concrete injury, that there is a causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct alleged that is traceable to defendant’s action, and that a favorable decision by the 
court will likely redress the injury. Id at 560–61. Constitutional standing requirements may 
not be overridden by statute or judicial intervention and directly restrict the cases the 
court may hear. See id. at 560. 
58 See Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 11–12. 
59 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501. 
60 See id. at 500. 
61 Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring). 
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 More specifically, the self-imposed prudential limitations are firmly 
rooted in the separation of powers doctrine . . . .”62 Courts have even 
explicitly stated that “separation-of-powers considerations properly find 
a place in judge-made prudential aspects of standing.”63 In Warth v. 
Seldin, the U.S. Supreme Court found that absent prudential standing 
limitations, “the courts would be called upon to decide abstract ques-
tions of wide public significance even though other governmental insti-
tutions may be more competent to address the questions . . . .”64 Pru-
dential standing limitations ensure that a plaintiff has personally suf-
fered an actual injury and possesses a right to action.65 
 Courts have historically recognized two prudential limitations: (1) 
the prohibition against generalized grievances and (2) the prohibition 
against third party standing.66 The prohibition against generalized 
grievances prevents parties from suing when their injuries are shared 
equally among a large class of persons.67 In Allen v. Wright, the Court 
denied standing to a multi-state group of African-American parents 
who sued the Internal Revenue Service for failing to implement guide-
lines on denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private 
schools.68 The Court held that a mere assertion that the government 
was not enforcing its own laws did not create standing to sue.69 The 
Allen court drew its holding from the separation of powers doctrine, 
recognizing that a different holding for the plaintiffs would require the 
court “to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the Ex-
ecutive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.”70 
 The prohibition against third party standing prevents a litigant 
from raising legal claims that belong to a third party.71 This was the 
central issue in Wilderness Society IV.72 In general, this prudential stand-
ing rule avoids litigation over rights that the harmed party may not wish 
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. (discussing the Court’s decision in Warth). 
63 Id. 
64 422 U.S. at 500. 
65 See id. at 501 (noting a plaintiff must “allege a distinct and palpable injury to him-
self”). 
66 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Some courts have recognized a third 
“zone of interest test.” Id. The Tenth Circuit suggested that such a test would not apply in 
preemption cases such as this one. Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y III ), 581 
F.3d 1198, 1217 n.11 (10th Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). 
67 Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. 
68 468 U.S. at 739–40. 
69 Id. at 754. 
70 Id. at 761. 
71 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12. 
72 632 F.3d at 1171–72. 
48 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39: E. Supp. 
to assert.73 It also assures the court that the party with the most at stake, 
who is theoretically also the best advocate, is the party bringing the law-
suit.74 This rule ensures “that a person cannot challenge the constitu-
tionality of a statute unless he shows that he himself is injured by its op-
eration.”75 In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the plaintiff, a 
parent of disputed custodial rights, was denied standing to sue on be-
half of his daughter.76 The rule against third party standing as articu-
lated in Newdow limits the Court’s rulings to those constitutional ques-
tions that involve a concrete individual harm.77 Thus, in Newdow, the 
plaintiff’s disputed custodial position left the Court unwilling to allow 
him to speak for his daughter.78 By restricting the types of cases they 
may hear, courts ensure that plaintiffs have a concrete and particular-
ized interest in the case.79 This rule also enhances the separation of 
powers by preventing courts from deciding broad questions of abstract 
significance, thereby intruding into the province of other branches of 
government.80 
 The third party standing requirement, however, allows exceptions 
in limited circumstances.81 In order to defeat the general rule against 
third party standing, the litigant must demonstrate a close relationship 
with the injured party and a genuine obstacle that prevents the right-
holder from protecting his own interests in court.82 Often, courts have 
permitted third party standing “when enforcement of the challenged 
restriction against the litigant would result indirectly in the violation of 
third parties’ rights.”83 Thus, in Griswold v. Connecticut, when a physician 
was convicted of illegally giving contraceptive advice to married pa-
tients, the Court allowed the physician to assert the rights of the mar-
ried persons whom he advised.84 These exceptions require that the 
plaintiff prove a concrete and particularized injury, thereby assuring 
                                                                                                                      
73 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978). 
74 Id. 
75 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). 
76 542 U.S. at 17–18. 
77 See id. at 11. 
78 See id. at 17–18. 
79 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
80 Id. 
81 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). 
82 Id. at 130. 
83 Warth, 422 U.S. at 510 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965); Barrows, 346 U.S. at 257). 
84 381 U.S. at 481. 
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that the harm is not too abstract for justiciability or more appropriate 
for consideration by another branch.85 
III. Analysis 
 In Wilderness Society v. Kane County, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that TWS lacked prudential standing because it was asserting 
a third party’s rights over the roadways.86 The court held that the rights 
in question belonged to the federal government.87 This ruling, how-
ever, neglected to take into account the individual harms to the local 
Wilderness Society members caused by the off-highway use of the 
roads.88 Had the court recognized the recreational and aesthetic harm 
to TWS’s members, independent of any harm to the United States, the 
court’s ultimate holding would have been different.89 Furthermore, the 
en banc court blindly applied the prudential standing rules without 
considering their historic rationale.90 This irrational application of the 
rules neglected the separation of powers policy underlying the pruden-
tial standing considerations.91 If the court had considered those goals 
along with TWS’s individual harm in applying the prudential standing 
rules, TWS would have had standing.92 
 Wilderness Society IV is distinctive among environmental cases be-
cause the central issue turns on prudential standing and not on a dis-
tinct cause of action conferred by statute.93 Despite this unique charac-
                                                                                                                      
 
85 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. 
86 Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y IV ), 632 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 
2011) (en banc). 
87 Id. at 1171. 
88 See Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty. (Wilderness Soc’y III ), 581 F.3d 1198, 1210 (10th 
Cir. 2009), vacated en banc, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011). 
89 See infra notes 93–104 and accompanying text. 
90 See infra notes 105–127 and accompanying text; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
751 (1984) (criticizing the mechanical application of the constitutional standing doc-
trine). 
91 See infra notes 105–127 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra notes 105–127 and accompanying text. 
93 The majority of cases focusing on environmental issues discuss either constitutional 
standing (with no prudential standing analysis) or focus on the prudential “zone of inter-
ests” test. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (discussing only constitutional 
standing); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (discussing only constitu-
tional standing); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (discussing whether the Sierra 
Club had an environmental injury-in-fact, a constitutional requirement); Mount Evans Co. 
v. Madigan 14 F.3d 1444 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding no constitutional standing, and discuss-
ing only the zone of interests test with regards to prudential standing); Utah Shared Access 
Alliance v. Carpenter, 463 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing only the prudential zone 
of interests test); Am. Mining Cong. v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding no 
50 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39: E. Supp. 
terization, the majority decision framed the issue in the case as one of 
contested property rights between two landowners, the BLM and Kane 
County.94 Thus, it concluded that TWS “lack[ed] any independent 
property rights of its own” and consequently TWS was not permitted to 
assert the rights of the federal government.95 As Judge Lucero indi-
cated in the dissent, however, “title of the United States to the property 
at issue was never properly challenged.”96 Thus, the property dispute 
should not have been the focus of the decision.97 
 By mischaracterizing the nature of the dispute, the court failed to 
distinguish the individual harms asserted by TWS members from the 
unrelated property dispute.98 Allowing off-highway vehicle use on the 
contested roadways unambiguously harms the members’ “health, rec-
reational, scientific, spiritual, educational, aesthetic, and other inter-
ests.”99 Consequently, off-highway vehicle use on the contested road-
ways directly “negatively impact[s]” the members’ interests.100 
 Had the court properly characterized TWS’s members’ interest in 
the case, it would have recognized that the individual harms TWS as-
serted in its attempt to enjoin Kane County’s actions gave TWS stand-
ing before the court, independent of any harm to the BLM’s property 
rights.101 Courts should not hide behind the prudential standing limi-
tations when “plaintiffs seek redress for their own injuries under their 
own causes of action.”102 As here, where a plaintiff is advocating for his 
own rights based on a concrete injury, the basic prudential concerns 
about standing are typically satisfied so long as the constitutional pre-
requisites are met.103 Recognizing such independent harms would have 
                                                                                                                      
constitutional standing, and discussing only the zone of interests test with regards to pru-
dential standing). 
94 Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1171. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1182 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 Wilderness Soc’y III, 581 F.3d at 1210. One of the members declared that she enjoyed 
“‘hiking . . . camping, birdwatching, discovering fossils and archaeology, study, contempla-
tion, solitude, photography, and other activities’” near the contested roadways. Id. She 
described how she preferred the land where off-highway vehicles are prohibited, and has 
visited areas near the contested land multiple times a year since 2003. Id. Another member 
asserted similar interests and harms. Id. at 1211. 
100 Id. 
101 See Wilderness Soc’y IV, 632 F.3d at 1190 (Lucero, J., dissenting). 
102 See id. 
103 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80–81 (1978). 
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required the majority to decide in favor of the environmental plain-
tiffs.104 
 In addition to ignoring the individual harms to TWS members, the 
court did not consider the separation of powers concept at the root of 
the prudential standing rules.105 As illustrated in Elk Grove, Allen, and 
Warth, the prudential standing doctrine rose directly out of the judici-
ary’s concern for the proper, limited role of the judicial system in gov-
ernment.106 Here, the court blindly applied the rigid rules of pruden-
tial standing without proper consideration of why those rules exist.107 
TWS’s injuries place it within an exception to third party standing— 
when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant 
(TWS) would directly impact a third party’s rights (BLM).108 Thus, 
where the plaintiff has demonstrated a direct, concrete injury, the pru-
dential standing rules should not be a bar to court adjudication of the 
issue.109 
 A primary concern of the third party standing rule is that the liti-
gant may not be the best advocate for the rights in question.110 Adver-
sarial trials require that both parties advocate vigorously and present 
the best legal arguments for their position.111 Additionally, courts worry 
that the party whose rights are asserted may not wish to have its rights 
litigated.112 Typically, this rule enhances the separation of powers by 
preventing the courts from deciding cases that have abstract signifi-
cance to the parties.113 By refusing to issue decisions in such cases, 
courts are less likely to intrude into the province of the other branches 
of government.114 
 A worry that a litigant may not be the best advocate for the rights 
in question, however, ought not to be a consideration when the party is 
asserting its own individual harms or a right in which it has a major 
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stake.115 Here, TWS members have a strong personal concern for the 
preservation and conservation of the wild desert in southern Utah.116 
In contrast, the BLM as a government entity “cannot suffer an aesthetic 
or recreational injury in its own right.”117 Furthermore, the BLM has 
no individual wants or needs, but is instead a conglomeration of indi-
viduals who may not have these environmental interests at heart.118 
Thus, in many ways, the TWS members’ personal connection to the 
land makes them better advocates for the land’s preservation than the 
bureaucratic BLM.119 Consequently, because enforcement of the 
County’s actions against the BLM would directly harm TWS, the court 
ought to set aside its concern about deciding cases of abstract signifi-
cance regardless of the party’s relationship to the case.120 
 A second worry of third party standing is that the silent party may 
not wish for its legal claims to be asserted.121 “Disregarding the individ-
ual . . . choices of a . . . rightholder[] places the court squarely in the 
realm of deciding public norms-—a role decried by the separation of 
powers purpose . . . .”122 Though the choice of the right-holder is of 
paramount importance, where that person is silent courts ought to un-
dertake a nuanced, individualized assessment of the facts of each case 
to determine what the party’s silence truly means. 
 Here, the dissent argues that the fact that the BLM has not insti-
tuted legal proceedings against Kane County does not mean that the 
BLM does not want the court to proceed.123 In fact, such silence could 
be “just as easily interpreted as acquiescence to the plaintiffs’ ac-
tions.”124 The dissent notes that the BLM objected to the County’s erec-
tion of signs and enactment of the ordinance even before the suit was 
filed.125 Further, the agency was even briefly a party to the suit.126 The 
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dissent points out that the en banc majority interprets the agency’s cur-
rent “silence as a clear denunciation of plaintiffs’ claims,” but there is 
no evidence of such condemnation.127 Without confirmation that the 
choices of the right-holder are being disregarded, there is no reason for 
the court to disregard the affirmative harms the County’s actions would 
impose on TWS members.128 
 Further, courts have explicitly allowed exceptions to the third party 
standing rule in cases where enforcement of the restriction against the 
litigant would indirectly harm the third party.129 This is the case in this 
situation. The BLM will be injured by the court’s denial of prudential 
standing to TWS because ultimately county roads would traverse large 
portions of its land, contrary to BLM policy.130 Thus, even the tradi-
tional prudential standing analysis calls for awarding standing to TWS 
in situations where its members face injury as third parties.131 
 In Wilderness Society IV, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
TWS lacked prudential standing because it was asserting the BLM’s 
rights.132 Had the court independently recognized the recreational and 
aesthetic harm to TWS’s members the court would have found that 
TWS had prudential standing.133 Further, if the court considered the 
separation of powers goals in applying the prudential standing analysis, 
it would have recognized that allowing standing in this case was consis-
tent with the separation of powers rationale.134 In fact, such a holding 
would be consistent with a typical prudential standing analysis because 
enforcement of the challenged restriction would directly harm TWS 
members and the BLM.135 Thus, the court ought to have undertaken an 
individualized assessment of the facts of the case prior to its decision. 
Conclusion 
 The full environmental impact of the County’s actions in opening 
roadways in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument to off-
highway vehicle use may not be known for decades. There is no doubt, 
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however, that the Tenth Circuit’s en banc decision denying the envi-
ronmental plaintiffs standing will dramatically affect protection of indi-
vidual citizens’ aesthetic and recreational interests in the wilds of 
southern Utah.136 Instead of applying rigid rules to each situation, the 
courts ought to take into account the individual facts of each scenario 
and the reasoning behind the rules they are applying.137 Such consid-
erations would drastically change the legal landscape for environmental 
plaintiffs.138 
 The holding carelessly applied the prudential standing rules with 
no consideration of their underlying purpose, and it will have repercus-
sions beyond the confines of the 1.7 million acres of the Monument.139 
Further, the court’s decision will deny multitudes of individuals living 
near federal land or using the land the right to assert their own recrea-
tional and aesthetic interests.140 
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